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ABSTRACT 
Objectives: To examine the effects of Medicare’s revised ambulatory surgery center (ASC) payment 
schedule on overall payments for outpatient surgery. 
Data Sources: Twenty percent sample of national Medicare claims. 
Study Design: We conducted a pre-post study of Medicare beneficiaries who underwent 
outpatient surgery in a hospital outpatient department (HOPD), ASC, or physician office 
between 2004 and 2011. Specifically, we used multivariable regression to compare temporal 
trends in outpatient surgery before and after implementation of Medicare’s revised payment 
schedule in 2008, which reduced ASC facility payments to roughly two-thirds that of HOPDs. 
Our outcome measures included overall Medicare payments, utilization rates, per beneficiary 
spending, and average episode payments for outpatient surgery. 
Principal Findings: Between the last quarters of 2007 and 2008, overall Medicare payments for 
outpatient surgery grew by $334 million—an amount nearly three times higher than would have 
been expected without the policy change (P<0.001 for the difference). While utilization rates of 
outpatient surgery were attenuated, per beneficiary spending and average surgical episode 
payments increased by 10.4% and 7.8%, respectively, over the same period. By the end of 2011, 
Medicare payments for outpatient surgery reached $5.1 billion. Without the policy change, they 
would have totaled only $4.1 billion. 
Conclusions: Despite lessening demand, reduced ASC facility payments did not curb spending 
for outpatient surgery. In fact, overall payments actually increased following the policy change, 
driven by higher average episode payments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This year alone, Medicare beneficiaries will undergo 17 million outpatient surgical 
procedures (Cullen, Hall, and Golosinskiy 2009). Payments for related services account for 11% 
of per capita spending and are rising at a rate of 5.5% annually (Health Care Cost Institute 2015; 
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 2015), making outpatient surgery one of the largest 
and fastest-growing healthcare sectors for the Medicare Program. Much of this growth is due to 
the rising popularity of ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs), visits to which have increased 300% 
over the last decade (Cullen, Hall, and Golosinskiy 2009). These freestanding facilites—many 
owned by the surgeons who staff them (Choudhry, Choudhry, and Brennan 2005)—have 
incentives that spur utilization (Hollingsworth et al. 2010; Hollingsworth et al. 2011). Thus, 
efforts to curb spending for outpatient surgery should include a focus on ASCs. 
Recognizing this, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) revised its 
ASC payment schedule in accordance with the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003 (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2007)/ Using the 
Outpatient Prospective Payment System (PPS) relative payment weights as a guide, CMS 
reduced ASC facility payments to roughly two-thirds that of hospital outpatient departments 
(HOPDs) for the same services (Medicare Learning Network 2014). Paying ASCs less than 
HOPDs for the same services, combined with the movement of more outpatient surgical 
procedures away from hospitals (Hollingsworth et al. 2012a), has the potential to reduce overall 
spending for outpatient surgery.  
However, it remains unclear whether the intended ffects of this policy change were 
realized. In this context, we conducted a pre-post study using a 20% sample of national Medicare 
data. Specifically, we evaluated trends in overall Medicare payments, utilization, per beneficiary 
spending, and episode payments for outpatient surgery following CMS’s implementation of its 
revised ASC payment schedule in January 2008. Our study will be of immediate interest to 
decision makers at CMS, as findings from it will provide actionable insights moving forward for 
the redesign of policies to reduce payments for outpatient surgery and curtail growth in surgery 
spending more broadly.  
 
METHODS 
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Data for our study were obtained from 20% of the Research Identifiable Files (RIFs). 
Produced by CMS, these files contain a nationally representative random sample of Medicare 
beneficiaries with claims submitted on their behalf over an eight-year interval between January 
1, 2004, and December 31, 2011. We limited our study to beneficiaries age 66 and older with 
continuous enrollment in Medicare parts A and B six months prior to their index surgical 
encounter. We xcluded Medicare Advantage beneficiaries because the services provided to 
them are captured inconsisten ly in their claims. 
 
Identifying and characterizing beneficiaries who underwent outpatient surgery 
We applied relevant Health Care Procedure Coding System codes to identify 
beneficiaries with encounters for surge y on the integumentary (10040 to 19499), 
musculoskeletal (20005 to 29999), respiratory (30000 to 32999), cardiovascular (33010 to 
39599, 92950 to 92998, 93451to 93662), digestive (40490 to 49999), urinary (50010 to 53899), 
male (54000 to 55980) and female genital (56405 to 59899), endocrine (60000 to 60699), 
nervous (61000 to 64999), ocular (65091 to 68899), or auditory system (69000 to 69990). 
Given our interest in outpatient surgery, we then used appropriate place of service codes 
embedded within claims from the Carrier and Outpatient RIFs to distinguish procedures 
performed in a physician’s office (11), HOPD (22), or ASC (24). Further, we limit d our 
analysis to beneficiaries who were treated by procedural-based specialists through line Medicare 
specialty codes for general surgery (02, 28, 91), otolaryngology (04), cardiothoracic surgery (33, 
78), obstetrics and gynecology (09), neurosurgery (14), ophthalmology (16), orthopedic surgery 
(20, 40), plastic and reconstructive surgery (24, 85), urology (34), and vascular surgery (76, 77). 
We determined each beneficiary’s age at the time of surgery, gender, race, and l vel of 
comorbid illness [using an adaption of the Charlson index (Klabunde et al. 2000)]. For analytic 
purposes, we then assigned all beneficiaries to healthcare markets, as defined by the Dartmouth 
Atlas’s hospital referral region (HRR) boundaries (Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care 2016). With 
county-level data from the American Community Survey and Area Health Resource Files 
(United States Census Bureau 2015; Health Resources and Services Administration 2016), we 
characterized these HRRs according to the percentage of their residents living below the federal 
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average annual income, and the number of allopathic physicians serving them (per 10,000 
population).       
 
Primary and secondary outcomes 
Our primary outcome was overall Medicare payments for outpatient surgery. To calculate 
this outcome, we selected a timeframe around the service date wide enough to capture all 
expenditures plausibly related to surgery. Because postoperative complications and unplanned 
admissions are uncommon following outpatient surgery (Hollingsworth et al. 2012b), we used a 
24-hour claims window to define an outpatient surgical episode and extracted all payments from 
the Carrier and Outpatient RIFs that fell within the window. For each HRR, we then summed up 
these payments by quarter.  
In addition, we had three secondary outcomes. To understand how overall payments 
related to use, we calculated overall utilization rates for outpatient surgery, where the numerator 
was a count of the number of outpatient procedures performed in a physician’s office, HOPD, or 
ASC for a given HRR-quarter, and the denominator was the number of beneficiaries residing in 
the HRR. To determine whether changes in overall payments were driven by changes in the 
population at risk, we calculated per beneficiary spending, aggregating episode payments across 
procedures for each HRR-quarter and dividing by the number of beneficiaries residing in the 
HRR at that time. Finally, to examine the association between overall payments for outpatient 
surgery and spending during the surgical encounter, we measured average episode payments for 
each HRR-quarter. 
 
 Statistical analysis 
With the HRR-quarter serving as our unit of analysis, we then fitted separate regression 
models to assess the impact that CMS’s revised ASC payment schedule had on overall payments, 
overall utilization rates, per beneficiary spending, and average episode payments for outpatient 
surgery. We modeled overall payments, per beneficiary spending, and average episode payments 
using ordinary least squares regression (Greene 2003).  Given the non-normal distributions of per 
beneficiary spending and average episode payments, we log transformed these variables 
(Manning and Mullahy 2001). We modeled overall uti ization rates using Poisson regression 
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Our model specification had to satisfy three objectives. First, it must allow us to estimate 
the counterfactual trend in our outcomes after January 1, 2008 (i.e., if CMS’s policy change had 
not occurred). Second, our specification had to accommodate the possibility of drift in the 
policy’s effects over time. Third, it had to be exempt from multicollinearity issues, while 
maintaining a high degree of flexibility in modeling both baseline time trends and potential 
policy impact drift. To achieve these objectives, we used polynomial transformati n of time 
trends in modeling the counterfactual trends and policy effects (Long and Ryoo 2010). Further, 
we improved our models’ stability through basis-spline transformation as appropriate (Eilers and 
Marx 1996). 
All models included the time, in quarters, since implementation of the revised payment 
policy. This was set to 0 during the last quarter of 2007, -1 for the third quarter of 2007, +1 for 
the first quarter of 2008, and so on and so forth.  We adjusted for the sociodemographic and 
case-mix variables (aggregated to the HRR-level) described above.  We also controlled for the 
availability of freestanding ASCs in each HRR. 
We performed our analyses using the statistical software package R. All tests were two-
tailed and we set the probability of Type 1 error at 0.05. Our Institutional Review Board deemed 
that this study using de-identified data was exempt from its oversight. 
 
RESULTS 
Table 1 displays characteristics of our study population at three time points. In this 
nationally representative sample, there were 6,565,430 outpatient surgical episodes in 2005, 
6,889,023 episodes in 2008 (coinciding with CMS’s launch of its revised ASC payment 
schedule), and 7,341,625 episodes in 2011. Sociodemographic characteristics and comorbid 
conditions were relatively consistent across study years. The ten most common outpatient 
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The distribution of outpatient surgery by place of service was relatively stable over the 
study interval (Figure 1). The percentage of outpatient surgical encounters to ASCs and 
physician offices increased slightly from 6.7% and 73.6% in 2004 to 7.7% and 74.7% in 2011, 
respectively. This was accompanied by a small decrease in the percentage of encounters to 
HOPDs, from 19.7% to 17.6% over the same time period. 
Figure 2 shows that the rate of rise in overall Medicare payments for outpatient surgery 
was not blunted by implementation of CMS’s revised ASC payment schedule. Between the last 
quarters of 2007 and 2008, overall Medicare payments for outpatient surgery grew by $334 
million. This amount was nearly three times higher than would have been expected if CMS 
maintained its old ASC payment schedule (P<0.001 for the difference). This spending growth 
occurred despite the fact that overall use of outpatient surgery was attenuated by the policy 
change (utilization rates rose 6.9% following the policy change but would have been expected to 
increase by 29.1% absent the change; P=0.004). Further, this spending growth was not due to a 
shift in the delivery of care from costly inpatient stays to cheaper ambulatory settings, as 
payments for inpatient surgery increased in concert with outpatient surgical spending from $17.1 
to $19.5 billion over the study interval. 
Figure 3 suggests that rising overall Medicare payments for outpatient surgery were due 
to higher per beneficiary spending (A) and, more specifically, higher av rage episode payments 
(B), which rose 10.4% and 7.8%, respectively, between the last quarters of 2007 and 2008. Both 
increases were higher than would have been expected if CMS maintained its old ASC payment 
schedule (P<0.001 for the differences). Driven by these increases, Medicare payments for 
outpatient surgery reached $5.1 billion in the last quarter of 2011. In the absence of the policy 
change, outpatient surgery spending i  this quarter would have been only $4.1 billion. 
 To explore unbundling or upcoding as possible explanations for our findings, we 
examined temporal trends in coding intensity for outpatient surgical episodes, observing an 
increase over time in the mean number of line items per episode. When we collapsed these data 
into the pre- and post-policy periods (Appendix Table 2), we noted a significant increase in the 
mean number of line items per episode following implementation of the new ASC payment 
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In our study, we examined the impact that CMS’s revised ASC payment schedule had on 
Medicare spending for outpatient surgery. Despite reduced ASC facility payments, we found that 
spending actually grew at a faster rate than would have been anticipated in the absence of the 
policy change. This growth was not due to more outpatient surgical encounters among Medicare 
beneficiaries or changes in the population at risk, but rather it was driven by dramatic increases 
in episode payments. Collectively, our findings suggest that decision makers at CMS may need 
to consider additional strategies to rein in spending for outpatient surgery. 
Given that ASCs are no longer paid on par with HOPDs, our findings are somewhat 
surprising. One plausible explanation relates to an expansion in the number of ASC-covered 
procedures. Historically, CMS used a complex set of criteria to determine which procedures 
were eligible for payment when performed in an ASC. However, under the revised payment 
policy, facility payment to an ASC is allowed for nearly all procedures. Insofar as previously 
uncovered procedures were already being performed in ASCs, overall payments would rise even 
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Our findings may also be explained by a higher intensity of care delivery. CMS allows 
ASC payment for multiple procedures. Although subject to a multiple-procedure discount (i.e., 
Medicare pays 100% of the highest paying procedure on a claim, plus 50% of the payment rate 
for the other covered procedures), an increase in the average number of procedures performed 
during the same encounter could contribute to outpatient spending growth. So, too, could the 
unbundling of procedure billing codes into component procedures. This practice was observed 
during CMS’s rollout of its inpatient PPS (Gay and Kronenfeld 1990). Our exploratory analysis, 
which revealed a significant increase in the mean number of line items per episode following 
implementation of the new payment schedule, supports this possibility. 
Several limitations of our study merit further discussion. To begin, revisions to CMS’s 
ASC payment schedule were implemented simultaneously nationally. Thus, we could not 
observe the counterfactual trends. Due to this limitation, we stimated the policy change’s effect 
based on the following three assumptions. First, for a given outcome, its counterfactual 
measurements (i.e., those without the policy change) during the post-implementation period and 
its pre-implementation observations formed a curvilinear trend line.Second, bending of the 
curvilinear trend line at 2008 was due to the impact of the policy change. Third, the curvilinear 
trend line could be perturbed by market changes and seasonality factors.  
In addition, we interpreted the observed trends in our outcomes as being due to the policy 
change. While we adopted highly flexible splines to capture the curvilinear trends, we must 
acknowledge that unmeasured variation may have occurred during 2008 that could add noise into 
our results. That being said, CMS’s revised ASC payment schedule was a system-wide policy 
change that occurred across the 2008 timeline. As such, we would argue that our analysis 
correctly captures the impact of the policy change to the first-degree of approximati n. Finally, 
although increasing average episode payments appear to underlie the growth in overall payments 
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Limitations notwithstanding, our study has important implications for ongoing payment 
and delivery system reforms. In order to reduce outpatient surgery spending, decision makers at 
CMS might consider extending inpatient episode-based bundling programs such as the Bundled 
Payments for Care Improvement Initiative and the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement 
model to outpatient surgical procedures (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2016). For 
example, rather than paying providers (e.g., facilities, physicians, nonphysician clinicians) for 
each individual service that they provide, providers would accept a lump sum payment based on 
the clinical condition being treated for the entire outpatient episode. Providers would then divide 
the payment among themselves, thereby limiting their incentive to do more. 
Alternatively, decision makers could try to affect upstream clinical decision-making. One 
way of doing this would be to bring surgical providers into the fold of accountable care 
organization (ACO) formation (Dupree et al. 2014). If ACO participants reduce their 
expenditures below benchmarks, they are rewarded with a portion of the savings. To the extent 
that participating surgeons are motivated by such shared savings or feel pressure from referring 
primary care physicians to lower their treatment costs, they may selectively limit their use of 
discretionary procedures, lowering overall Medicare spending for outpatient surgery. 
In summary, our findings suggest that CMS’s revised ASC payment schedule did not 
accomplish the intended effect of reducing overall payments for outpatient surgery. While the 
policy change did curb overall utilization rates, average episode payments increased. Moving 
forward, research in this area should focus on examining the root of this unintended consequence 
by unpacking outpatient surgical episodes. Moreover, CMS may want to c nsider alternative 
payment models for outpatient surgery that reward surgeons who perform high-value, low-cost 
outpatient surgical care.  
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Figure 1. Distribution of outpatient surgery by place of service over the study interval. 
Abbreviations: ASC, ambulatory surgery center; HOPD, hospital outpatient departm nt; 
OP, outpatient. 
 
Figure 2. Temporal trends in overall Medicare payments for outpatient surgery. 
 Abbreviation: USD, United States Dollars. 
 
Figure 3. Temporal trends in per beneficiary spending (A) and average episode payments (B) for 
outpatient surgery. 
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2005 2008 2011 
No. of eligible beneficiaries in the 20% sample 5,016,615 4,733,462 4,850,533 
No. of outpatient surgical episodes 6,565,430 6,889,023 7,341,625 
Average age at the time of surgery, in years (SD) 70.6 (1.2) 70.4 (1.2) 70.2 (1.2) 
% of patients undergoing surgery who were male (SE) 44.5 (1.6) 45.0 (1.5) 45.5 (1.4) 
% of patients undergoing surgery who were white (SE) 86.9 (11.1) 86.4 (11.3) 85.6 (11.4) 
Average Charlson score at the time of surgery (SD) 2.5 (0.3) 2.5 (0.3) 2.5 (0.3) 
Average per capita income, in 1000 USD (SD) 31.2 (6.1) 36.7 (7.1) 38.3 (6.8) 
14.1 (4.4) % of population living below federal poverty limit (SE) 14.0 (3.8) 16.6 (4.0) 
27.2 (4.7) % of population with Bachelor’s degree (SE) 24.6 (6.2) 25.2 (6.3) 
20.7 (7.7) No. of active MDs, per 10,000 population (SD) 21.7 (8.4) 21.2 (8.3) 
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